Nuclear deterrence in second tier nuclear weapon states

a case study of India
  • 91 Pages
  • 1.56 MB
  • English
Centre de Sciences Humaines , New Delhi
StatementManpreet Sethi
SeriesCSH occasional paper -- no. 25/2009
ContributionsFrance. Ambassade (India). Centre for Human Sciences
The Physical Object
Pagination91 p. ;
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL24425369M
LC Control Number2010318702

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Nuclear weapons are a necessary evil to protect America’s security and freedom in today’s world. However, politicians too frequently side with nuclear weapons opponents and refuse to adopt the policies required to maintain the readiness of the U.S.

nuclear arsenal and adapt it to growing and emerging : Fred Fleitz, Michaela Dodge, Eric Edelman. Downloadable. The study examines the manner in which India is engaged in constructing a credible and stable deterrence relationship with two of its nuclear armed adversaries, Pakistan and China with an arsenal much smaller, and command and control structures far simpler than in any of the P-5 nations.

Nuclear Deterrence Theory is a very important work for students of strategy. Unfortunately, the book was published near the end of the Cold War when interest in nuclear strategy was waning. Consequently, it is not remembered as the important work that it by: Request PDF | Nuclear Deterrence in Second Tier Nuclear Weapon States: A Case Study of India | The study examines the manner in which India is engaged in constructing a credible and stable Author: Manpreet Sethi.

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Low-yield nuclear weapons do not add to the deterrence of North Korea because the United States is basically uncontested in its nuclear capability.

Although U.S. assets such as ICBMs and nuclear bombers are based at home, the delivery time to. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion.

The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy.

For decades, the reigning scholarly wisdom about nuclear weapons policy has been that the United States only needs the ability to absorb an enemy nuclear attack and still be able to respond with a devastating counterattack.

Nuclear deterrence in second tier nuclear weapon states book This argument is reasonable, but, empirically, we see that the US has always maintained a nuclear posture that is much more robust than a mere second-strike capability.

in different ways and used nuclear weapons to pursue a range of political ends. This article offers a simple theory that allows scholars to make sense of this variety. I offer an explanation for why different states use nuclear weapons to facilitate different combinations of six foreign policy beha.

Nuclear Incoherence: Deterrence Theory and Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons in Russia Full Article It is likely to remain as such for both current and prospective nuclear states that consider an asymmetrical deterrence posture.

(Hebrew) earned the prize for the best academic work on Israeli security in His second book The Culture of. Deterrence theory can be used to explain why the United States built approximat nuclear warheads, more than all other nuclear-weapon states combined, during the Cold War.

This sent a message to the adversary, in this case the Soviet Union, that attacking the US would undoubtedly result in mass destruction. T he world has been nervous about nuclear bombs ever since Augustwhen the United States dropped two of them on Japan, thus ending World War II.

(The bombs killed aboutpeople; the. Five are considered to be nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are the United States, Russia (the successor state to the Soviet Union), the.

The New Era of Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Conflict We have published a series of articles in recent years about the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

1 Taken together, these articles ad - vance two main arguments: First, technological innovation has dramati. THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR USE AND DETERRENCE. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the first time that nuclear weapons were used on civilians.

The indiscriminate, massive destruction that a single bomb could cause struck fear File Size: KB. In mid a second conference for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will take place in Geneva. Given the importance of preventing, or at least slowing down, nuclear weapon proliferation, this conference will be a crucial event in the field of arms control and disarmament.

For many countries the technical and economic barriers to proliferation have disappeared, and the only. U.S. nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Posture Review also stated that the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that were parties to and.

The nuclear proliferation argument is made both ways. On the one hand, failure of the nuclear-weapon states to give up their advantage may lead to proliferation by non-nuclear-weapon states. On the other hand, the removal of extended deterrence from non-nuclear-weapon states.

The second is that the principal nuclear threat to U.S. security now derives from proliferation of nuclear weapons rather than conflict among the five declared nuclear weapons states. There is at this time no plausible scenario projecting nuclear conflicts among the five, with a possible exception of a reemergence of a highly nationalistic.

The United States was the first country to manufacture nuclear weapons and is the only country to have used them in combat, with the separate bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War and during the Cold War, it conducted over one thousand nuclear tests and tested many long-range nuclear weapons delivery systems.

Nuclear Weapons and the Challenge of Regional Rivalries edited by Lawrence Rubin and Adam N. Stulberg. Georgetown Press,pp. Georgetown Press,pp. The term “strategic stability” originated from the Cold War competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear Weapons, Brinkmanship, and Deterrence: A Cheat Sheet1 1 Nuclear Crises and Brinkmanship Thomas C. Schelling formalized deterrence and the e ect of nuclear weapons in terms of game theory, a eld of economics which attempts to model strategic interactions between states in terms of mathematical models.

His two books, The Strategy of Con. Kissinger took on an easy target in the doctrine of massive retaliation, but this is nonetheless an ambitious book — and one that opened up a Pandora’s box of nuclear weapon. Researched developments and trends in advanced nuclear weapon technologies, delivery systems, space, cyber and implications for future nuclear/non-nuclear warfare.

Howe is a former US Army Armor Officer, was a nuclear weapons employment officer, and earned a MA in International Relations from University of Southern California. No new nuclear-weapons states: we must draw a line under the current eight and a half nuclear powers and say unambiguously, “Stop.

No more.” In. One of the problems with U.S. extended nuclear deterrence is that, although Europe may have gotten rusty on its nuclear strategyU.S.

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allies in Asia never even got to touch the book. Since. The second challenge to rethink nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence comes from the new treaty proposing a comprehensive prohibition on all nuclear weapons.

A nuclear deterrent is sometimes composed of a nuclear triad, as in the case of the nuclear weapons owned by the United States, Russia, the People's Republic of China and India.

Other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, have only sea- and air-based nuclear weapons. Proportionality. Some scholars have even thrown into question whether nuclear weapons have any coercive value beyond strategic deterrence: the use of nuclear weapons is unnecessary for most military objectives and extremely costly since it can provoke strong reprisals and condemnation (Todd S.

Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy. Since its inception inthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has played a critical role in spreading the norm of nuclear nonproliferation and in preventing many non-nuclear-weapon states from developing nuclear weapons.¹ Scholars estimate that without the making of the NPT, approximately fifteen countries would have become nuclear.

A nuclear weapon(also called an atom bomb, nuke, atomic bomb, nuclear warhead, A-bomb,or nuclear bomb) is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission(fission bomb) or from a combination of fission and fusionreactions (thermonuclear bomb).

Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter. @article{osti_, title = {Nuclear weapons and strategic deterrence}, author = {Boucher, W and Renfro, W L}, abstractNote = {The nuclear freeze issue limits its sights to the US-Soviet path of interaction but does not address the problem of proliferation and the possibility that other nuclear countries will increase the risk of an interaction that can lead to a nuclear exchange.Start studying Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, & Proliferation.

Learn vocabulary, terms, and more with flashcards, games, and other study tools. -were concerned the motive for these states wanting nuclear weapons are not good. -need to have stockpiles of nuclear weapons that are dispersed for second strike capability.Nuclear Weapons and the Early Cold War: Holloway, David.

"Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, –" Chapter 18 in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume I: Origins.

Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad. Cambridge University Press, ISBN: 7: Nuclear Proliferation and Nonproliferation.